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Iraq - 18 March 2003

Mr. David Curry (Skipton and Ripon): Tonight's vote is not about whether there is war or peace. It is a vote about whether there is war with us or without us, and, by extrapolation, about whether there is reconstruction with us or without us—and, by further extrapolation, about whether there is a rebuilding of international institutions with us or, perhaps, not at all.

I will go into the Government's Lobby tonight after travelling a rocky and reluctant road, and without enthusiasm. I want to explore why so many people are concerned about the prospect of war, and why this war has commanded so little general support in comparison with previous conflicts.

When the Prime Minister put British troops into Sierra Leone, I thought that that was an act of outstanding courage. There were no votes in it, and no issues that would sway British electors; the Prime Minister saw it as a moral concern. When we participated in Kosovo and Afghanistan, it was apparent to me that that was the right thing to do. Humanitarian and security issues were at stake, and ethics and politics met.

I do not have the same conviction over Iraq. For one thing, we have been told specifically that it is not a humanitarian issue. The Foreign Secretary has said clearly that, if Saddam were to give up his weapons voluntarily and easily, he would stay in power. He would then be free to continue his activities, in power. It may be that, by accident and miscalculation, we can turn this into a humanitarian issue, but we did not embark on this venture for humanitarian purposes.

It is a pre-emptive war in its conception. However much I share the loathing for the Iraqi regime, I believe that there must be special reasons for embarking on a pre-emptive war. Of course there is a generic threat to the UK from the existence of weapons that lend themselves to terrorism. That is the reason that President Bush used in his broadcast much earlier today, but it has not been demonstrated that there is a specific threat to the UK.

The Prime Minister says that the national interest is at stake. It is, in the general sense that our national interest is to have a world that is well ordered and democratic rather than one that is unstable and run by despots. However, I and many other people cannot see how that national interest is more threatened today than it was three, five or 10 years ago. Indeed, my understanding is that over that period Iraqi capability has been degraded, and that Saddam has been debilitated and pegged down—that deterrence, in a nutshell, is working. We must remember that, in many ways, the war started a long time ago, with the constant aerial intervention over Iraq.

People say, "Well, the Prime Minister must know something we don't." We have all rather taken in refuge in the belief that the Prime Minister must have access to information that we do not have. The Government speak with such categorical certainty about Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction that one is inclined to believe them. But does Saddam Hussein have such weapons? Will we find the arsenals that we believe are there?
The nuclear inspectors have talked about the matter, but not with the apparentness to which public opinion responds. Moreover, the Government have made some statements that have been at odds with statements in the document that they issued in September, especially in connection with the building of nuclear capacity.

Mr. Edward Leigh (Gainsborough): I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. It is unlikely that I will be called to speak, so I am adopting all his arguments, but is not the logic of the American position regime change? Trust has broken down so much that the Americans could never be sure that Saddam would ever give up all his weapons. Ever since 11 September, they have been determined to change the regime in Iraq.

Mr. Curry: I agree with my hon. Friend, but the problem is that America's reasons for the war have changed often. The Americans have given a number of reasons for the war, and the UK has always been careful to exclude regime change from our rationale, but there is a dislocation between the logic being brought to bear in Washington and the logic here.

The Government seem to postulate a choice between the forcible disarmament of Saddam, and the inevitable rebuilding of his weaponry. Given the degree of surveillance constantly applied to Iraq, I wonder whether that really is the only choice at hand.

The Government say that they will fight to uphold the will of the UN or of the international community, but we chose the UN route knowing its rules. The Government pulled President Bush down that route, and we all applauded when they did. It is difficult now to invoke a mandate based on furthering the interests of the international community in the UN when we acknowledge that the UN would not deliver the endorsement that we sought.

The problem is that the US has given the impression that its only interest in the UN was to get its approval for war, and not to exploit the potential for progress by non-military means. Every report from the weapons inspectors has invariably been greeted by Washington as a causus belli. The US has shown a palpable distaste for the whole UN operation.

Of course I believe that the French actions would have been a great deal more plausible had President Chirac said that, if Saddam did not conform to UN requirements after a certain period, French troops would take their place alongside other troops in the Gulf. That he did not say that is a signal failure on his part. French policy has failed but, if France stands accused of wanting to veto war whatever the circumstances, many observers drew the conclusion that that was in reaction to an apparent US predetermination for war. The Americans' reasons for war kept changing, but their military build-up was remorseless.

I have real concerns about the position of the UK. I respect the depth and power of the Prime Minister's conviction that the policy is right, but there is a real danger that the UK will fail to meet US expectations, while at the same time it is burning its boats in respect of relations in Europe. I have doubts about whether the policy—if it is the Government's policy—that the UK can act as influence, harness, guide and tutor to the exercise of power by the world's only superpower is, in the long term, any more than a historical intellectual conceit.

Mr. Harry Barnes (North-East Derbyshire): Is not another problem with UK involvement in this adventure that we are the old imperial power in Iraq? People in Iraq and throughout the Arab world must understand that. Even in 1955, we had Crown territories in the area, and Iraqi military recruits had British officers. Will not that pose a serious problem for how the Arab world perceives the UK?

Mr. Curry: I suspect not, as a matter of fact. I think that that history has died. I believe what is said about the relationship of the Iraqi people to their regime.

However, the question of how we cope with the world's only hegemon, especially after 11 September, is a real issue. I hope that the Government do not believe that the right answer is to ride postillion. There is an urgent need for us to repair relations in Europe, and for Europe to rebuild transatlantic partnerships. A Europe of 25 member states will be more flexible and open to influence than one still dominated by historical and traditional axes. If 11 September brought a new world to the American continent, enlargement will certainly bring new politics to Europe.

All European states ultimately have an enormous stake in the EU, the UN and NATO. Those structures are now badly fractured, but they are still of proven resilience.

I share the bewilderment of millions of Britons as to how we got here. It is reasonable for that unease to be registered in this Chamber tonight, but one thing that we must conclude is that the UK has to think hard about its role in the world, and about how its interests are best served in that world.

The decision tonight is not about whether there should be peace or not, because that decision has passed us by. If it had not passed us by, I should have had no hesitation about going into the Lobby that stands for peace. However, I must decide what my country's legitimate role and influence are. I have to decide how best I can propel my country to be that force in world affairs that is part of our historical destiny and which, to use a Gallic word, is our vocation.

That is why, with much heart rending, I shall go into the Government Lobby tonight. We must throw open the debate to deal with what happens in the aftermath of war. We must discuss how we reconstruct and rebuild, and how we can avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. If we do that, the conflict—which we all pray will be as short and clean as conflicts ever can be—will have taught something to us, as well as to our enemies.

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David Curry MP | House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA | tel: 020 7219 6202